

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

MSG. 9-56

Approved For Release 2000/08/24 : CIA-RDP71B00263R000200290015-1

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INFO

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PRIORITY 25X1A6c

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REF: A. 4658 25X1A6c
B. 8035

1. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN REF A WERE MISUNDERSTOOD, MISINTERPRETED OR BOTH. IT IS REITERATED THAT WIRING PROBLEMS WERE IDENTIFIED DURING THE COURSE OF THE INITIAL INSTALLATION OF THE SYSTEM, BUT IN SOME CASES, CORRECTIVE ACTION COULD NOT BE TAKEN UNTIL A LATER DATE.

2. NO ONE AT THIS DETACHMENT WAS FAMILIAR WITH SYSTEM 17 OR WITH THE SHIPS WIRING ASSOCIATED WITH THAT SYSTEM. SYSTEM 17 UTILIZES MORE THAN 15 CONNECTORS AND CABLES WHICH ARE USED PRIMARILY WITH SYSTEM 6. THE SYSTEM 6 CONNECTOR MUST BE DISCONNECTED AND A SYSTEM 17 CONNECTOR HOOKED UP. THERE IS NO CONSOLIDATED LISTING OF THESE

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GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTO-
MATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION

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CHANGES, AND MANY COULD NOT BE FOUND OR IDENTIFIED UNTIL THE CONFIGURATION WAS INSTALLED IN THE ARTICLE AND A SEARCH INITIATED TO FIND OUT WHERE A DANGLING SYSTEM CABLE WAS SUPPOSED TO GO. IT TURNED OUT THAT REMOVAL OF THE AIRCRAFT BATTERY AND ONE 400 CYCLE INVERTER IS REQUIRED TO GAIN ACCESS TO CERTAIN OF THESE CONNECTORS. EVEN THE THREE SYSTEM 17 PEOPLE ON TDY HERE WERE NOT FAMILIAR WITH THESE NECESSARY CHANGES AND CONNECTOR LOCATION, AS THE WORK PREVIOUSLY HAS ALWAYS BEEN PERFORMED BY ZI LAC PERSONNEL. THUS, LITTLE OR NO WIRING CHECKOUT COULD BE PERFORMED PRIOR TO THE TIME THE CONFIGURATION WAS HUNG IN THE Q-BAY.

3. THE RECENT FORCED GROUNDING OF THE ARTICLE CUT HEAVILY INTO THE NORMAL FLIGHT SCHEDULE THAT IS REQUIRED TO KEEP THE DRIVERS CURRENT. WHEN THE ARTICLE WAS FINALLY RELEASED FOR FLYING, THE SCHEDULE WAS SUCH THAT AVIONICS AND LAC PERSONNEL HAD ACCESS TO THE ARTICLE ONLY AT NIGHT, OR WHEN FLYING WAS CANCELLED DUE TO WEATHER.

4. THE TDY PERSONNEL ARRIVED ON SUNDAY, 19 NOV. 20 NOV WAS LOST BECAUSE OF UNBOXING AND INVENTORYING SYSTEM EQUIPMENT. WORK ACTUALLY STARTED ON SYSTEM CHECKOUT 21 NOV AND CONTINUED THROUGH 24 NOV, THANKSGIVING INCLUDED. THE WORKING DAY RAN FROM 12 TO 16 HOURS. BY NOON OF 24 NOV, AVIONICS REPORTED THAT THE SYSTEM WAS READY FOR TESTING,

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BUT THAT THERE WERE KNOWN TROUBLES IN SOME OF THE UNITS. ACCESS TO THE AIRCRAFT, HOWEVER, HAD TO WAIT UNTIL 1900L OF THAT DAY DUE TO A/C FLYING AND SUBSEQUENT REQUIRED MAINTENANCE.

5. THE ACTUAL INSTALLATION OF THE SYSTEM WAS STARTED AT 1900L AND IT WAS ONLY THEN THAT A FULL SCALE TEST OF THE SHIPS WIRING COULD BE MADE. PROBLEMS WERE IDENTIFIED AND WHERE POSSIBLE, CORRECTED. CORRECTION OF THE PROBLEM OF PARA 2 B REF B WOULD HAVE REQUIRED REMOVING THE CONFIGURATION FROM THE Q-BAY AND THEN REMOVING THE SHIPS BATTERY. THE LOSS OF "TIME" INTO THE NC RECORDER, PARA 2 E REF, COULD ONLY HAVE BEEN CORRECTED IN THE SAME MANNER.

6. WHEN ALL OF THE WIRING FAULTS HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED, THE TIME WAS 0300L OF THE MORNING OF THE FLIGHT, 25 NOV 67.

7. BECAUSE OF THE TIGHT FLYING SCHEDULE, IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO GROUND THE ARTICLE JUST TO CORRECT THOSE KNOWN FAULTS, THEREFORE THE ARTICLE TOOK OFF ON SCHEDULE, WITH THE CABLE FAULTS KNOWN AND IDENTIFIED. CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS DELAYED UNTIL SUNDAY 26 NOV WHEN NO FLYING WAS SCHEDULED.

8. AT THIS DATE, THE ARTICLE IS FLYING WITH A "JURY RIG" COAX CABLE THAT SERVES THE FUSELAGE MOUNTED PDC ANTENNAS. THE TAIL OF THE ARTICLE MUST BE REMOVED TO MAKE PERMANENT REPAIRS. IT IS NOT PLANNED TO PULL THE TAIL UNTIL THE SCHEDULED P.E. LATER THIS MONTH. THIS WAS DISCUSSED WITH

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[REDACTED] DURING THEIR RECENT VISITS.

9. SHIPS WIRING PROBLEMS AND OTHER DIFFICULTIES, AS REPORTED, IN NO WAY IMPLY THE SYSTEM WAS HASTILY OR CARELESSLY PREFLIGHTED OR THAT WIRING CHECKS WERE NOT COMPLETED AS SOON AS PRACTICAL. CAREFUL, COMPLETE RADIATED AND CONDUCTED MEASUREMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE BOTH IN THE AVIONICS SHOP AND WHILE THE SYSTEM WAS INSTALLED IN THE ARTICLE.

10. [REDACTED] DET CO CONSIDERS THE MAJOR PROBLEMS WITH THIS SYSTEM FALL INTO THREE CATEGORIES:

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A. INADEQUATE FLT TESTING ACCOMPLISHED IN ZI PRIOR TO DELIVERY TO [REDACTED] 25X1A2d2

B. SYSTEM HAD TO BE MATED TO A/C WITHOUT BENEFIT OF DESIGN ENGINEER BEING PRESENT OR THE PRESENCE OF PERSONNEL WHO ARE INTIMATELY FAMILIAR WITH THE ENTIRE SYSTEM AND A/C.

C. INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION AND INADEQUATE COORDINATION BY HQS AVIONICS STAFF ON SYSTEM DEPLOYMENT AND USE. EXAMPLE, MUCH OF THE EQUIPMENT THAT ARRIVED ON C-141 NEED NEVER HAVE LEFT THE ZI. THIS EQUIPMENT IS BEING PROCESSED FOR RETURN TO ZI. ANOTHER CLASSIC EXAMPLE OF INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION AND COORDINATION IS THE FUTURE DEPLOYMENT OF SYSTEM 21. THIS ENTIRE PROBLEM WAS DISCUSSED WITH GEN BACALIS AND [REDACTED] DURING THEIR VISIT LAST WEEK.

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